Technological di¤usion via FDI is essential for the economic growth of backward economies. However, institutional and policy barriers may slow down technology di¤usion. Using a simple theory based on Acemoglu (2009, ch. 18), we predict that there exists an interaction (i.e., a complementary) e¤ect between inward FDI (pool of available world frontier technologies) and …nancial deregulation (enhancing absorptive capability via lowering institutional and policy barriers) in promoting growth. We test the predictions using the panel data on Chinese provinces during the reform and opening-up period. The Chinese experience is appealing because
Introduction
For developing countries, their rate of economic growth depends on the adoption of new technologies transferred from leading countries (Acemoglu, 2009 , ch. 18; Barro and Salai-Martin, 2004, ch. 8). Foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered to be a major channel for technology di¤usion (e.g., Findlay, 1978; Keller and Yeaple, 2003) . 1 Although theory predicts that FDI spurs the growth of the host country, the empirical evidences are mixed both at the macro-level (Borensztein et The Chinese experience o¤ers a natural experiment that suits our purpose. First, the Chinese economy switched from a closed central-planning regime to an open and marketoriented one in 1978. Since then, the Chinese government has made herculean e¤orts not only in attracting FDI, 3 but also in reforming its unhealthy …nancial system. 4 This yields a symbiotic evolution of …nancial deregulation and FDI in ‡ow. Second, China adopted the gradual approach to reform and opening-up (Naughton, 1995) , which results in substantial time and province variations in policies and FDI in ‡ows. Figure 1 illustrates some of the large variation in our measure of FDI, which displays yearly FDI to GDP (gross domestic product) ratios for two provinces (GD, i.e., Guangdong, and GS, i.e., Gansu). We combine the technology di¤usion model based on Acemoglu (2009, ch. 18) and the augmented Solow model (see Mankiw et al., 1992) to illustrate the mechanism. The model
shows that the speed of technological progress of a backward economy positively depends on the product of its technological absorption capability and its distance to the world frontier technologies that are available for absorption. Financial deregulation policies positively raise the absorption capability of the backward economy as postulated by Acemoglu. The world frontier technologies are made available for absorption by inward FDI.
Taken together, the model predicts an interaction e¤ect between …nancial deregulation and FDI in increasing the growth rate of output per labor of the backward economy.
We then derive the empirical formulation. Approximating around the steady state, we derive the convergence equation for output per e¤ective labor. The growth rate of output per labor equals that of output per e¤ective labor and that of technology. Therefore, our …nal empirical convergence speci…cation for the growth rate of output per labor is similar to the augmented Solow model (see Mankiw et al., 1992 , p. 423), with some additional independent variables that capture the growth rate of technological progress that depends positively on the interaction between inward FDI and …nancial deregulation.
We test the theoretical predictions on the panel data of Chinese provinces. The LSDV (Least squares dummy variables) regression shows that the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction term between …nancial deregulation and FDI is positive and signi…cant at the 5% level. The result is robust when we overcome the endogeneity of FDI by using suitable instruments in LIML (limited-information maximum likelihood) regressions. The result holds up when we use system GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimation to deal with the endogeneity of important explanatory variables. 
where K, H, and L are physical capital, human capital, and raw labor respectively. A is the level of technology, whose movement will be pinned down later. The output per e¤ective labor at t is y it = k it h it , where the e¤ective capital-labor ratio, k it , and the e¤ective human capital-labor ratio, h it , evolve according to
where s k , s h are exogenous physical and human capital investment rates respectively.
n and are exogenous population growth rate and depreciation rate respectively. And
is the growth rate of technology.
The world technological frontier A w t is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate g w . Unlike
Acemoglu, we assume that, at any time, the available pool of technology for imitating depends on how many foreign …rms conduct direct investment in the backward province i, which is measured as inward FDI to GDP ratio (denoted as F DI it ). Therefore, we posit the law of motion for technology as
where it is the absorptive capability of the backward province i at time t, and measures domestic technological advances.
We argue that …nancial deregulation would raise the absorptive capability of the backward economy. Using F -Reform it to denote the degree of …nancial deregulation for the backward province i at time t, we postulate that
The reason is as follows. In backward countries, there often exist di¤erent types of …nancial distortions and protectionist policies (Easterly, 1993; Borensztein et al., 1998 ).
These …nancial distortions may discourage imitative entrepreneurial activities. In other words, …nancial deregulation aiming at eliminating these …nancial distortions would raise the absorptive capability of the backward economy. This assumption actually follows Acemoglu (2009, p. 614 ) . Acemgolu argues that varies across countries because of policy barriers a¤ecting technology adoption. We simply apply this assumption to Chinese provincial …nancial deregulation policies.
It is worth noting that our assumption in equation (5) As in Acemoglu, we de…ne the inverse of the distance to the world frontier as
Using equation (4), we have
We begin with the steady state. In the steady state, the technological progress rate of the small economy, g it , is equal to g w . And in steady state, k it = 0 and h it = 0. Then steady state output per e¤ective labor can be solve as
Approximating around the steady state, the speed of convergence is = (1 ) (n + g w + ). 
where ln (y i ) can be expressed as exogenous parameters as in equations (7) 
Combining equations (8) and (9) yields
The technological growth rate of the small economy, g it , is
Substituting out g it using equation (11) and ln (y i ) using equation (7) from equation (10), we have our …nal empirical speci…cation as
In equation (12), the last four terms are exactly the same as those in augmented Solow model (see Mankiw et al., 1992) . The …rst two terms are new and capture the technological absorption of the backward economy. Given . The direct e¤ect of …nancial reform is negative, as re ‡ected in the term ( it ), given that
is that …nancial deregulation raises the absorptive capability of the backward economy, yielding a higher speed of its technological progress. This would decrease the technological gap between this economy and the world technological frontier, ending up with less room for catch-up. In summary, according to equation (12) , …nancial deregulation has two e¤ects on economic growth. The …rst is a direct one via changing the absorptive capability.
The seond is an interactive one via interacting with FDI.
Speci…cally, we use the following empirical formulation:
where growth it is the average annual growth of real GDP per worker for i th province at period t, ln
F DI GDP
and F -Reform -detailed below -are the inward FDI to GDP ratio and the degree of …nancial deregulation respectively. ln
is real GDP per worker at the beginning of period t to control for conditional convergence.
I GDP
and School measure physical and human capital investment rates respectively. (n+g w + ) measures labor force growth. The group of other control variables comprises those that are frequently included as determinants of growth in cross-country studies, namely, government consumption and export to GDP ratios. We control them to avoid omitted variable biases. u i and T t stand for …xed province and time e¤ects respectively.
Data

Measuring FDI
The provincial FDI in ‡ow data and the GDP data are available from the Statistical Yearbook of China (SYC). China has adopted the …xed exchange rate regime in our data sample. The FDI data are in US dollars, we multiply them by the …xed exchange rate of the Chinese currency (yuan) against the US dollar in each year to get the FDI data in
Chinese currency. We then calculate the ratios of FDI over nominal GDP in each year as our measure of FDI, denoted by FDI/GDP.
Quantifying Financial Reform Policies
We locate the …nancial reform policies from the book "The Big Economic Events since China's Reform and Opening-up (1978-1998)". 5 Since the book covers the period 1978-1998, our data sample ends at 1998. Following the division by the Chinese Economists Society's international symposium on Chinese …nancial reform at the University of Southern California in 1997, we divide the …nancial policies into …ve categories (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 here]
Then we use the following formula to turn policies in each of the …ve categories into …ve policy indexes. Since most …nancial deregulation policies are at the city level, we …rst construct the city level dummy variables. Then we aggregate them to the provincial level, using the ratios of the cities'population to their provincial population as weights:
T otal P opulation of City i in Y ear t T otal P opulation of the P rovince in Y ear t I
where I t ci is a dummy variable that equals one if city i receives a …nancial deregulation policy j in year t; I t p is an indicator variable that equals one if a …nancial deregulation 5 The attractiveness of the …nancial reform policies in the book lies in its provision for authority and uniformity. There are other books documenting the …nancial reform policies in China. The main …nancial reform policies are quite similar across those books.
policy j is conducted in the province. Adding together all policies (the j 0 s) in and before year t for all the cities within a province yields its policy index for year t. The data on the cities'population are from the Statistical Yearbook on China's Cities.
Using population rather than GDP as weight is to lessen the endogeneity problem of …nancial deregulation indicators. An ideal weight should further consider the quality of the enforcement of the policies. However, …nding a quality measure is a daunting task, hence we leave it to future research.
Given the four indicators (three on banking sector and one on non-bank sector), we add them up to get our measure of the degree of …nancial deregulation (F-Reform). We use this indicator for the following reasons. First, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) show that there is no evidence that banking sector (and/or non-bank sector) is worse than stock market in promoting growth. Previous literature commonly measures and studies banking sector and stock market separately. Second, for the period 1981-1998, the majority of …nancial reform policies are in the banking and non-bank sectors. and provided the data on provincial labor force. Therefore, this more consistent series provided by SYC allow us to cover the periods before and after 1990 to avoid "spurious labor force growth"(Young, p. 1234).
Initial real GDP per worker takes the value of the beginning year of each sub-period.
School is measured as secondary school enrollment (student enrollments for middle schools, grades 7 to 9, and high schools, grades 10 to 12) divided by labor force following Mankiw et al. (1992) . For labor force growth, ln(n + g w + ), we use 0.08 for (g w + ). That is, we assume a 2% world annual growth and a 6% depreciation rate for China. As in Mankiw et al. (1992) , our result is insensitive to the assumed number for (g w + ). F iscal and Export are nominal values of …scal expenditure and export to nominal GDP ratios respectively.
I GDP
is the nominal physical capital investment rate, which is to avoid the de ‡ator problem for investment in China (see Young, 2003) .
In sum, our data sample comprises panel data of 27 provinces and 18 years. 7 Following the standard approach in the empirical growth literature, we take six-year averages of the Chinese panel data to avoid the in ‡uence from business cycle phenomena, producing three time periods. Table 2 lists the summary statistics of the …nal data.
[ Table 2 here]
4 Empirical Results
LSDV Estimation Results
We …rst use LSDV estimation. That is, we use OLS (Ordinary least squares) estimation that includes 27 province dummies and 3 time dummies. Table 3 summarizes the results.
In regression 3.1, to ensure that the interaction term between FDI and …nancial deregulation does not proxy for FDI, we include FDI in the regression independently as well.
The regression results show that the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction term between FDI and …nancial deregulation is positive, which is signi…cant at the 5% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on …nancial deregulation is negative and insigni…cant, while that on FDI is positive but insigni…cant. We also test whether these variables a¤ect growth directly or through the interaction term. The hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of both …nancial deregulation and its interaction with FDI are zeros is rejected at the 5% level. That is, the combined e¤ect of …nancial deregulation on growth is signi…cant. The hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of both FDI and its interaction with …nancial deregulation are zeros cannot be rejected outright at the 10% level, which may be due to the endogeneity problem of FDI.
The F-test for the joint signi…cance of FDI, …nancial deregulation and their interaction term shows that these variables jointly signi…cantly impact growth at the 5% level.
One can also observe that the estimated coe¢ cient on initial real GDP per worker is [ Table 3 here] In summary, the LSDV results show that there is a signi…cant complementary e¤ect between FDI and …nancial deregulation in promoting the growth of the Chinese provinces.
LIML Regression
Here we …rst discuss the endogeneity problem of FDI and its identi…cation strategy. Then, we analyze the direction of causality between growth and …nancial reform to conclude that …nancial reform in China leads economic growth. Therefore, we only need to address the endogeneity problem of FDI in our empirical regressions.
Endogeneity of FDI and the Identi…cation Strategy
As is the case with the previous literature on the FDI-growth nexus (e.g., Borensztein et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004), we are aware that our regressions presented below are also subject to the endogeneity problem of FDI. We address the endogeneity problem of FDI by applying the instrumental variable (IV) technique and using contemporary weather conditions as instruments. We will use LIML estimation to test and deal with the presence of weak instruments.
Here we argue why weather conditions are plausible instruments for FDI. Weather conditions are among the many factors that generate the provincial variation in FDI in‡ows. The relationship between FDI and weather is discussed in Goldsmith and Sporleder (1998) . In analyzing the food and beverage …rms'FDI decisions, Goldsmith That is, those FDI in ‡ows tend to locate in Chinese provinces majoring in agricultural production that is heavily a¤ected by weather conditions. This is consistent with the sectoral composition of world FDI, as World Bank states that the sectoral focus of world FDI has shifted from agriculture to industry and later to service.
Nevertheless, we are aware that the channel that we emphasize here may be weak (see e.g., Stock and Yogo, 2002; Hahn and Hausman, 2005 for recent econometric progresses on weak instruments). Stock and Yogo (2002) show that LIML is far superior to 2SLS when instruments are weak. Therefore, we proceed with LIML estimation. Over-identi…cation tests will be employed to check the validity of the instruments. However, it is well-known that these tests have little statistical power. Therefore, …rst, we use di¤erent combination of weather conditions as instruments. When the results are robust with di¤erent subset of instruments, the validity of the instruments is enhanced (see Murray, 2006) . Second, in section 4.3 we use system GMM estimation that only needs "internal instruments" to deal with the endogeneity of all important explanatory variables.
We have seven contemporary weather indicators, namely, yearly temperature, rainfall, and hours of sunshine, three indicators measuring the variation of temperature, and one measuring the variation of hours of sunshine. We …nd, when available, the monthly average data on temperature, rainfall, and hours of sunshine for the period 1981-1998 from the Weather Yearbook of China and the Natural Resources Database of China Academy of Sciences. Based on the monthly data, we calculate the yearly average data and then take six-year averages. Table 4 explains the meaning and construction of the indicators.
Granger Causality between Financial Deregulation and Growth
China's …nancial deregulation policies precede economic growth. This is because many exogenous factors such as politics, culture and politician's preferences determine the provincial distribution of …nancial deregulation policies. Shirk (2003, p. 129), for example, argues that the Chinese …nancial liberalization was mainly conducted on a political ground.
A more formal way of examining the direction of causality between growth and …nan-cial reform is to apply tests in Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) . Let us use F-Reform to denote the measure of …nancial deregulation policies. Since our panel data have only three periods (each of which is a six-year average), it is impossible to lag growth for too many periods. To avoid this problem, we use year-to-year data. After lagging the variables, we end up with 432 observations. Following the speci…cation in Blomström et al. (1996) , we estimate the following:
where g t is real GDP per worker at year t, 8 and F -Reform t 1 is the average of the quanti…ed …nancial reform policies during year (t 1). We interpret …nancial reform to be Table 5 , and the corresponding second stage results are listed in columns 6.1 to 6.4 in Table 6 respectively.
The …rst stage results in Table 5 Table 5 and second stage results in column 6.4 in Table 6 . One can see that the F-test statistic on the instruments gets larger and the associated p-value decreases below 1%, meaning the four instruments have stronger e¤ects on FDI.
[ Table 5 here]
The second-stage results of the LIML estimation are reported in Table 6 . In regressions 6.1, the estimated coe¢ cient on FDI is positive and signi…cant at the 5% level. In regression 6.2, the estimated coe¢ cient on FDI becomes smaller, which is signi…cant at the 1% level. However, in these two regressions, the p-values of over-identi…cation tests are below 5%. This means that the instruments may be correlated with omitted variables such as …nancial reform and its interaction with FDI.
In regression 6.3, the estimated coe¢ cient on the interactive term between FDI and …nancial deregulation remains positive but becomes signi…cant at the 1% level (comparing to 5% level in LSDV regression). The estimated coe¢ cient on FDI remains positive but becomes signi…cant at the 1% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on …nancial deregulation is still negative but become signi…cant at the 5% level, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction in section 2. The endogeneity test on FDI yields a p-value below 1%, showing strong evidence of the endogeneity of FDI. Our weak identi…cation (CraggDonald) test statistic is 2.33 that is smaller than the critical value for the 25% maximal LIML size, meaning we accept the null hypothesis that the seven instruments are weak.
This justi…es our use of LIML estimation. Over-identi…cation test yields a p-value of 0.23, meaning we accept the null that the instruments are valid. The hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of both FDI and its interaction with …nancial deregulation are zero can be rejected outright at the 1% level. The hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of both …nancial deregulation and its interaction with FDI are zero is rejected at the 1% level. The test for the joint signi…cance of FDI, …nancial deregulation and their interaction term yields a p-value of almost zero, showing that these variables jointly signi…cantly impact growth.
In regression 6.4, we repeat the LIML regressions in 6.3, using the subset of four instruments. The p-value of the endogeneity test on FDI is still below 5%, rejecting the exogeneity of FDI. Our weak identi…cation test statistic increases to 4.07, which is larger than the critical value for the 15% maximal LIML size, meaning we can reject the null that the four instruments are weak. When instruments are not weak, LIML estimation is identical to 2SLS estimation. The LIML regression in 6.4 produces similar size estimates for our interested variables to those in 6.3. Moreover, the signi…cance levels are identical to those in regression 6.3. The p-value of over-identi…cation test is still above 10%, accepting the null that the instruments are valid. Although over-identi…cation test is known to have little statistical power, our results are robust to di¤erent combination of instruments, further justifying the validity of instruments (see Murray, 2006 ).
[ Table 6 here]
Although we have argued and shown that …nancial reform leads economic growth, the interaction term contains FDI so that it is subject to some degree of endogeneity problem. We also instrument FDI and the interaction term with the weather indicators.
To avoid under-identi…cation, we use all seven instruments. The …rst stage results are reported in 5.2 for FDI and 5.5 for the interaction term in Table 5 . The second stage results are presented in 6.5 in Table 6 . The p-value of the F-test on the joint signi…cance of the weather instruments in 5.5 is much larger than 10%, meaning that the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the weather instruments jointly have signi…cant e¤ects on the interaction term between FDI and F-Reform. Moreover, from regression 6.5, we can see that the endogeneity test p-value for the interaction term is 0.09, meaning we accept the null that the interaction term is exogenous at the 5% level. Therefore, we should prefer treating the interaction term as exogenous to regarding it as endogenous. In other words, regression 6.5 should be put less emphasis. Nevertheless, the estimated coe¢ cients on FDI, …nancial reform and their interaction term have the same signs as in regressions 6.3 and 6.4 and are all signi…cant at the 5% level.
The following presents an estimate of how important the absorptive capability (i.e., …nancial deregulation) and available world frontier technologies (i.e., inward FDI) have been in promoting growth. Using regression 6.4, it turns out that having a one standard deviation increase in ln(FDI/GDP) would have allowed provinces to experience an annual growth rate increase of 2.9% points during the 18-year-period, where the net e¤ect being measured is [ 1 + 2 mean( F -Reform)] ln(F DI=GDP ) . 9 Similarly, using regression 6.3, if provinces receiving the mean level of ln(FDI/GDP) in the sample had a one standard deviation increase in the F-Reform variable, they would have experienced an annual growth rate decrease of 2.2% points during the 18-year-period. This is predicted by the simple theory in section 2: …nancial deregulation has a negative direct e¤ect on growth, although it has a positive e¤ect on growth via interacting with inward FDI. Therefore, the combined e¤ect of …nancial deregulation on growth depends on the level of inward FDI. If we examine individual observations, it turns out that 13 out of the 81 observations would have experienced an annual growth rate increase given a one standard deviation increase in the F-Reform variable. This is because these observations have high and positive value of ln(FDI/GDP). The highest value of ln(FDI/GDP) comes from Guangdong province for the period 1993-1998, and it would have experienced an annual growth rate increase of 1.4% points given a one standard deviation increase in the F-Reform variable.
System GMM Estimation Results
Our model has the characteristics listed in Roodman (2006) . The dynamic structure of the model allows us to use system GMM estimation. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that system GMM estimator can dramatically improve e¢ ciency and avoid the weak instruments problem in the …rst-di¤erence GMM estimator.
Moreover, the advantage of system GMM estimation is that it only needs "internal" instruments. That is, the system GMM estimator estimates a system of two simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged …rst di¤erences as instruments) and the other in …rst di¤erences (with lagged levels as instruments). Therefore, we re-estimate our model with system GMM estimator. In using the system GMM, we treat initial real GDP per worker as predetermined, and all the other main independent variables (including FDI, …nancial deregulation and their interaction term) as endogenous. Following Roodman (2006), the province dummies are excluded, while the time dummies are used as exogenous instruments. The results are reported in column 3.5 in Table 3 .
Both the Sargan and the Hansen tests for over-identifying restrictions con…rm that the instrument set can be considered valid. The F-test shows that the overall regression is signi…cant. The Arellano-Bond test rejects the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the Therefore, the mean value of ln(FDI/GDP) and that of F-Reform are zeros. and …nancial deregulation in promoting economic growth.
The economic success of China is important not only because it has signi…cantly raised the welfare of Chinese people, but also because other transitional and underdeveloped countries may be able to learn something useful from the unprecedented Chinese experience. As far as this paper is concerned, the useful lesson is that it may be more desirable to attract more in ‡ows of FDI and at the same time to conduct …nancial deregulation to exploit FDI more e¢ ciently (that is, to absorb advanced technologies and management practices faster) so as to achieve a faster catch-up with leading economies. We cut the 18 years into three sub-periods and take six-year averages to avoid the in ‡uence from business cycles. Except for F-Reform and ln(
all other variables are multiplied by 100 before taking logarithm.
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